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Hannibal’s abilities as a general are legendary.1 In fact, the Carthaginian’s 
activities in the Second Punic War made such a lasting impression on 
history that the conflict was branded ‘Hannibal’s War’. 2  Yet, in all the 
narratives of the war and in biographies of Hannibal, his role as spymaster 
has been generally ignored. 3  The Second Punic War offers numerous 
examples of the advantages good intelligence can give to a political and 
military leader, and Hannibal was both. For nearly two decades the Romans 
found themselves locked in deadly warfare with a spymaster whose use of 
intelligence was unmatched. It was a contest that severely strained all of 
Rome’s resources – political, military, economic, and social – and yet it was 
Hannibal who ultimately lost the war. Hannibal, as a spymaster, can tell us 
much about the use of strategic and tactical intelligence, counterintelligence, 
and the role they played in the history, culture and international relations of 





Hannibal came to his command after the death of his father and Carthage’s 
loss of the First Punic War. Losing Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica to the 
Romans in the recent war led the Carthaginians to seek a new province to 
replace the sources of revenue and co-opted manpower of which they had 
recently been deprived. They began building a new empire in Spain that 
would help pay off their sizable war indemnity, and serve as a future base of 
operations against the Romans. The intelligence network, which had been 
so valuable an asset to the Carthaginians in Sicily during the First Punic War, 
was now extended to Spain. Carthaginian leaders regularly sent reports to 
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their Senate, and they appear to have been well-informed about the 
situation in Spain.4  
 When the 25-year-old Hannibal was placed in charge of the Spanish 
command in 221 BC, his goal was clear. He wanted to defeat Rome, take 
back Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica and restore the status quo ante bellum. In 219 
BC he laid siege to Saguntum, an unconquered city on the northeast coast 
of Carthaginian Spain, some ninety miles south of the Ebro River, which by 
treaty, was the demarcation line between the Roman and Carthaginian 
spheres of influence. 5  By attacking the city of Saguntum, Hannibal’s 
intentions were unmistakable; he was advancing towards Italy by land, and 
Saguntum was a pocket of resistance strategically situated on his line of 
supply and communication. He could not afford to leave this regional 
capital independent or in hostile hands as he moved forward to Gaul.6  
 
 
The spy game 
 
Since open warfare was imminent, discovering each other’s master plan was 
the major strategic-intelligence objective of both sides. Neither power could 
rely on just a messenger service or diplomatic correspondence; once 
hostilities broke out, a clandestine war also began. Through his spies in 
Rome, Hannibal learned that the Romans were planning a two-pronged 
attack on the Carthaginian capital and their Spanish empire. The Romans 
were outfitting a new fleet and the consul, P. Cornelius Scipio the Elder had 
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been assigned the province of Spain.7 The Roman plan was to transport 
legions by sea via Massilia to invade the Carthaginian Empire south of the 
Ebro River while a second consul would be sent south to strike directly at 
the Carthaginian capital. Hannibal had to prevent this opening of a second 
front in North Africa, and invading Italy was the best way to pull back the 
two consular armies. 
 Armed with the advanced knowledge of the Roman plans, Hannibal 
left his brother Hasdrubal with the Spanish command at New Carthage, and 
in May 218 BC moved his own troops north. The Romans had no idea that 
Hannibal would cross the Pyrenees and then the Alps to invade Italy.8 The 
Roman plan to strike at the heart of the Carthaginian Empire in the West 
was sound, except for the unanticipated twist that Hannibal would not be 
there. Hannibal’s superior intelligence and the audacious attack on north 
Italy succeeded in neutralizing the Roman plan. Both consuls were pulled 
back from their original routes and Hannibal got the advantage of fighting 
the war where he wanted to – in Rome’s backyard. Knowing the enemy’s 
intentions while keeping his own a secret gave Hannibal an untold 
advantage and enabled him to achieve a remarkable strategic surprise.9 That 
field security was weighing heavily on Hannibal’s mind is clearly 
demonstrated by his dismissal of 7,000 Carpetanian infantrymen whose 
reliability he had reasons to suspect after 3,000 of their fellow tribesmen 
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had requested, and were granted, discharge from his army once they had 
guessed their destination was Italy.10 
 The Romans were depending on foreign sources, i.e. their allies in 
Saguntum and Massilia for intelligence on the Carthaginians. What they 
received was very often too little and too late. Livy’s account shows us that 
Roman intelligence, and their diplomacy based on it, were both off the mark. 
The Senate instructed its legates to contact various Spanish and Gallic tribes 
to induce them into alliance with Rome, apparently not knowing that 
Hannibal’s agents had already been there and persuaded the Spanish 
tribesmen to turn the Romans away. When Roman envoys visited Gaul, 
they met with an even more contemptuous response; the Gauls burst into 
laughter. Their magistrates and elders could scarcely keep order among the 
younger men. To them, it seemed a stupid and impudent proposition that 
the Gauls should try to stop the invaders from passing into Italy. Why 
should they bring down the war on their own heads and have their own 
fields pillaged instead of Rome’s?11 
 The envoys’ mission thus failed miserably. Only Massilia, an 
established ally, responded to the Roman cause. The Massiliotes feared that 
a Carthaginian victory would ruin their own commercial activities, and so 
passed on to the Romans as much information as they had about 
Hannibal’s plans. It was from Massilian envoys that Scipio, prior to his 
departure from Rome, learned that Hannibal’s army had crossed the Ebro.12 
Only after Scipio’s arrival at Massilia with sixty warships did he receive the 
news that Hannibal was already past the Pyrenees, and would soon be 
crossing the Rhone as well. Scipio, on the other hand, postulated that 
Hannibal’s advance from the Pyrenees would be slowed down by hostile 
Gallic tribes and that there was no immediate cause for alarm. In reality, 
Hannibal was now less than 50 miles away, ferrying his army across the 
Rhone north of the delta, using smoke signals to coordinate the crossing.13 
The Romans were unaware that Hannibal had moved 50,000 men, together 
with cavalry, baggage and elephants, to the east bank of the river at a point 
so close to Massilia. 
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Scipio discovered Hannibal’s whereabouts only by chance. A Carthaginian 
reconnaissance patrol of 500 Numidian horsemen stumbled into 300 of 
Scipio’s cavalry on a similar mission.14 After a savage encounter in which the 
Numidian horsemen were defeated, the Romans pursued Hannibal’s men 
back to their camp. The Roman reconnaissance group reported the size of 
Hannibal’s encamped army to Scipio, who assumed that Hannibal was 
about to attack. Scipio concentrated his forces and returned to the enemy 
camp, only to find it abandoned. Finally, the horrifying truth dawned on 
him: Hannibal was not after him; Hannibal was heading for Italy. The 
Carthaginian was, again, one step ahead. Scipio left his brother Gnaeus in 
charge of the legions bound for Spain, and returned to northern Italy to 
meet Hannibal when he descended from the Alps. 
 Hannibal’s legendary crossing of the Alps was a political and military 
gamble, but based on the intelligence he had, the venture appeared no more 
perilous than any other course of action.15 It certainly was safer than trying 
to land a fleet on the western coast of Italy. The difficulties he faced were 
mostly military – hostile tribes, as well as the tactical disadvantage and 
logistic inconvenience of marching an army in column through narrow 
passes. True, he could have avoided some hardship had he crossed a month 
earlier when the weather was more clement, but we can only guess that 
resistance north of the Ebro had impeded his progress, or that wrong 
information about the Alpine passes caused unexpected delay. After all, 
even the most reliable intelligence is never perfect. Moreover, circumstances 
and the situation on the ground can change after the receipt of intelligence 
and before the commencement of operations. Native resistance may have 
been encountered where tribesmen had previously pledged co-operation, 
and some of the Alpine guides eventually proved treacherous. Our 
judgment of his plan should be governed by the fact that Hannibal did 
make every effort to obtain quantity and quality intelligence, well in advance 
of his march. And he did it on an impressive scale, covering virtually his 
entire theater of operations and adjacent areas of interest. If his intelligence 
                                                     
14  Polybius 3.44-45; N. Austin and N. Rankov, Exploratio. Military and Political 
Intelligence in the Roman World from the Second Punic War to the Battle of Adrianople 
(London and New York, NY 1995) 53. 
15  Although see: Hoyos, Hannibal’s Dynasty, 111, Hoyos believes the move cost 
Hannibal the war. Yet he also admits that with that reduced army, Hannibal won 
huge victories, detached half of Italy from its allegiance to Rome, and hemmed the 
Romans in with enemies at home and abroad. 




was imperfect, it is nonetheless safe to assume that without it he would not 
have been able to embark on his expedition.     
 In the end, the risks he had taken paid off handsomely; the news that 
Hannibal had encamped his army south of the Alps panicked the Romans. 
The consul T. Sempronius Longus, already down in Sicily and ready to 
invade Carthage, now raced to northern Italy, but the first clash between 
Romans and Carthaginians in Italy was over before he even arrived. This 
initial skirmish at Ticinus left the consul Scipio severely wounded and 
established the superiority of Hannibal’s cavalry. Hannibal pursued the 
fleeing Romans relentlessly. The 2,000 Celtic allies and cavalry serving as 




Intelligence and psychological warfare 
 
Another weapon in the arsenal of techniques that can be used by an 
intelligence chief is psychological warfare. Once in Italy, Hannibal used this 
technique to isolate Rome from its allies. Most of Italy at this time was not 
yet Roman territory, but a conglomeration of independent, autonomous 
states joined under Roman primacy. Hannibal aimed at driving a wedge 
between Rome and the other indigenous communities of Italy. From his 
first appearance on Italian soil, he announced that he had come not to fight 
against the peoples of the peninsula, but to liberate them from Roman 
domination. After every battle he released without ransom any non-Romans 
who had been taken prisoner, so that they would spread the word in their 
native regions about Hannibal’s political goals and his generosity. Such 
gestures were instrumental in recruiting local troops and depriving Rome of 
potential allies. This policy appears to have been more effective in luring 
converts to Hannibal’s cause from among non-Italian auxiliaries of Rome 
rather than among natives of the Italian peninsula.17 
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 A different aspect of psychological warfare to which Hannibal gave 
much attention was the construction of personality profiles: learning the 
frame of mind of the Roman commanders, and exploiting their attitudes to 
his own advantage. Matching one’s actions to the ‘mood’ of an enemy 
commander is a highly speculative business even when founded on accurate 
intelligence. Hannibal’s successful application of this concept on more than 
one occasion speaks well for his intelligence people.18 For example, when 
the consul Longus finally arrived in northern Italy with his troops, Hannibal 
was able, through his Celtic agents, to discover what the consul intended to 
do. After the recent Roman defeat, Longus was desperate for a spectacular 
victory to vindicate the Romans. Hannibal’s Gallic spies were very 
productive sources, since there were Gauls in both camps. They reported 
that Longus was anxious to fight, and Hannibal built on his impatience by 
luring him into a trap at the Trebbia River.19 Hannibal carefully selected an 
ambush site, and made maximum use of surprise and maneuver. The battle 
was fought utilizing every advantage of terrain, weather and psychology that 
Hannibal could bring to bear. Longus and his troops were annihilated, and 
the victory sent the Carthaginians on their way through the Apennines. 
 Meanwhile, Hannibal was preparing his next move by judiciously 
evaluating the information that flowed in from his agents. As usual, his 
decision was based upon sound appraisal of both the terrain and his 
opponents, and we are given another example of Hannibal’s aptitude for 
capitalizing on the enemy commander’s state of mind. The Roman citizens 
elected as one of the consuls for 217 BC the popular and experienced 
general Gaius Flaminius. His mandate was to intercept and stop Hannibal, 
and to do it quickly and surgically before the invader caused any serious 
damage.20 Flaminius positioned himself on the west-coast road to Rome 
along the Tyrrhenian coast, hoping to block Hannibal’s march south and 
                                                                                                                       
provision Hannibal, while in Polybius 3.69.5 the Celts between Po and Trebbia are 
allied with Hannibal but negotiate with Rome after Hannibal’s raids. 
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thereby make himself champion of the city. 21  Hannibal simply ignored 
Flaminius, by-passed his zone, and left the embarrassed consul behind to 
receive accounts of Hannibal’s men descending on the rich Tuscan villages 
like locusts. The psychological torture of watching, but doing nothing, was 
too much for Flaminius. He was lured into direct combat at a location of 
the enemy’s choosing: a trap set for him at Lake Trasimene. Nature had 
designed an ideal site for an ambush, and Hannibal took full advantage of 
that opportunity. From information brought by his cavalry scouts and, 
perhaps, from Etruscan peasants who knew the district, he acquired an 
accurate picture of the terrain. This intelligence enabled him to lure 
Flaminius into a narrow defile along the north shore of the lake. The 
slaughter was appalling. Over 15,000 Romans were killed, an equal number 
taken prisoner, and Hannibal now had virtual control over all of northern 
Italy. 22  Hannibal’s planning in this campaign exemplifies his masterly 
coordination of topographical knowledge with profound insight into his 
enemy’s character. News of the battle reached Rome two days later, and this 
disaster was by no means the end of bad tidings. Hannibal’s intelligence 
network discovered that a Roman force of 4,000 cavalry was marching 
down the Via Flaminia. Neither the details nor the exact location of this 
second engagement are known, but Hannibal’s advanced knowledge of its 





When the command of the Roman troops again changed and Q. Fabius 
Maximus became dictator, he avoided meeting Hannibal in pitched battle 
and instead began a long, tedious game of cat-and-mouse which earned him 
the nickname Cunctator, ‘the Delayer’. The strategy itself was quite clever, 
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because he was not just avoiding Hannibal, but restricting Hannibal’s 
movements and therefore his ability to provision his army.23 The strategy 
annoyed many Romans who wanted to see the honor of their legions 
upheld. Rumors spread that Fabius was in the pay of the Carthaginians. 
Hannibal used the situation for a shrewd psychological manipulation. When 
his scouts picked up these rumors, Hannibal deliberately avoided lands 
owned by Fabius while burning everything around them. That Hannibal 
could identify which lands belonged to Fabius was in itself an impressive 
feat of intelligence gathering. Not only did this scheme lend credence to the 
stories, but it also made Fabius so conscious of the damage to his own 
credibility that he signed over his lands to the state to prevent further 
speculation against him.24 Such clever stratagems suggest a continuing ability 
to obtain intelligence on the Romans that could be used to affect the 
Roman troops psychologically. 
  Hannibal demanded accurate intelligence, and the punishment for 
not meeting his requirements was severe. When he asked guides to take him 
to Casinum, they misunderstood and led him instead to Casilinum. The 
terrain there was such that Hannibal was nearly trapped. He rounded up the 
guides and had them crucified.25 His famous escape from that area through 
the pass called Iugum Calliculae was only one of many instances where a 
seeming Roman victory was snatched away. Unable to withdraw through 
the Casilinum road which was tightly blocked, Hannibal had to move up the 
mountains and cross the ridges of Callicula, knowing that the Romans 
might fall on his troops as they were marching through the gorges. He 
decided to approach the heights under cover of darkness. Before dusk the 
Carthaginians had tied bundles of dry wood to the horns of 2,000 head of 
cattle, and Hasdrubal was assigned to drive this herd by night on to the 
mountains, climbing above the pass held by the Romans. On a given signal, 
they lit the wood and the screaming cattle stampeded, igniting bushes and 
shrubbery along the way. When the Roman sentries saw the fires overhead, 
they thought they were surrounded and abandoned their posts. Hannibal 
brought his entire army safely through the pass, killing Romans along the 
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way. Fabius had heard the commotion, but thought it was an ambush and 
kept his men close at hand, since he disliked night combat. By daybreak the 
Carthaginians were gone except for a contingent of Spaniards whom 
Hannibal had left behind to cover his rear, and these troops were better 
than the Romans at mountain fighting. The Romans lost several thousand 
men, while Hannibal sustained hardly any casualties except the poor cattle.26  
  At the end of his year as consul, Fabius handed over command of 
half of his forces to M. Minucius Rufus, the Master of the Horse in 217 BC. 
He did so with a warning to avoid a pitched battle at all costs, but Rufus 
represented a faction in Rome that badly wanted a victory over the 
Carthaginians. Hannibal’s spies were able to follow the dissension between 
the two generals and capitalize on it to set another trap.27 Rufus swallowed 
the bait and would have been annihilated if it were not for the arrival of 
Fabius’ army to save him. Whether Hannibal received his intelligence from 
deserters, prisoners of war, or by merely questioning nearby residents, he 
managed to obtain precisely the information he needed. Over and beyond 
these elementary modes of collection, placing spies inside the enemy camp 
is at once the most profitable and most difficult undertaking in the 
cultivation of sources, yet it was a feat which Hannibal accomplished with 
remarkable success. In addition to penetrating Roman military camps, 
Hannibal’s spies also operated in the Roman capital. One of these, 
according to Livy, had been active in the city of Rome for two years, but 
was eventually caught and his hands were cut off. 28  Other spies stayed 
undetected and reported back to Hannibal about a dispute within the 
Roman leadership over the conduct of war. Hannibal hoped to exploit this 
disagreement to stage one last impressive victory on the battlefield and 
finally to convince Rome’s remaining allies to come over to him. 
 Hannibal found his victory on the plains of Cannae in 216 BC. He 
met the Romans in battle and used a double envelopment maneuver that 
                                                     
26 Livy 22.15-17; Plutarch, Fabius Maximus 6; Polybius 3.93-94, Walbank, Commentary 
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and Chemical Warfare’, The Classical Journal 63.3 (1967) 117-125. On Hannibal’s 
need to move in order to feed his army, see: Shean, ‘Hannibal’s Mules’, 181-185. 
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has become famous among military historians.29 In just over five hours of 
battle he killed more than 50,000 Roman troops, his most triumphant 
engagement on Italian soil.30 The consequences of Cannae were momentous. 
For the first time, Roman allies showed signs of disloyalty; defections now 
began.31 Italy’s second largest city, Capua, was the first to defect, followed 
by Tarentum. Even the Gauls responded: one of the consuls designate was 
ambushed near Mutina and his army destroyed. His head decorated the 
sacred sanctuary of the Boii.32 Almost half of Rome’s allies in Italy had been 
won over by Hannibal; but these defections mark the high point of 
Hannibal’s campaign. He has been criticized for not attacking Rome itself. 
His own cavalry commander supposedly told him ‘you know how to gain a 
victory (...) [but] you know not how to use one’.33 Rome, however, was a 
large, densely-populated, and walled city. His army had failed in assaults on 
even small forts. He had neither the manpower, the artillery, nor the 
financial resources for a protracted siege of a metropolis the size of Rome 
and besides, that had never been his intention. Plus his strategy had very 
frequently relied on the element of surprise; this time, the Romans were 
expecting him.34 
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32 Livy 23.24.11-13. 
33 Ibidem, 22.51.4.  
34 J. Lazenby, ‘Was Maharbal Right?’ in: T. Cornell, B. Rankov and P. Sabin ed., The 
Second Punic War: A Reappraisal (London 1996) 41. There are many historians who 
still think it was possible; See: Shean, ‘Hannibal’s Mules’, 159, 184-185 who believes 
this is a historical tradition perhaps started by Livy himself. Contra Hoyos, 
Hannibal’s Dynasty, 119-120; On the logistical considerations, see: P. Barceló, ‘Punic 




The road to defeat 
 
After Cannae the tide slowly began to turn against Hannibal, owing in part 
to disagreement between Hannibal and the Senate at Carthage regarding the 
conduct of the war. 35 He may have been his own spy chief, but he worked 
for the Carthaginian government. Hannibal wanted all available 
reinforcements sent to him in Italy, and to have his brother join him from 
Spain. The Carthaginian Senate, on the other hand, allowed him only a few 
thousand men, while the bulk of additional reserves were apportioned to 
Spain and Sardinia. 36  Without these reinforcements, Hannibal could not 
permanently hold what he had gained by fighting. Without a permanent 
base of supply, Hannibal was also severely restricted in his freedom of 
action. No system of supply by plunder would work in southern Italy for an 
army as large as Hannibal’s. Meanwhile, the obvious need for reliable 
communications had to be addressed. Hannibal sought a seaport through 
which he could be resupplied from the East or from Africa, and which 
could also serve as a communication link.37 He attempted to capture Naples, 
only 350 miles from Carthage, but the Romans had the city too well 
garrisoned. This was the same problem Hannibal faced throughout 
southern Italy. Although he was undisputed master of the land and could 
ravage it at will, he nevertheless commanded an army of conquest, not of 
occupation. He developed no siege-warfare capabilities – no towers, no 
battering rams, no catapults, all of which were essential for reducing 
strongly-garrisoned cities. Under these circumstances he could conquer, but 
not consolidate. Even with a long-range intelligence effort it would have 
been extremely hard for Hannibal to predict with certainty whether Italian 
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communities would desert Rome and join his cause prior to Hannibal’s 
arrival at the regions in question. If he had a contingency plan prepared in 
the event that the Italian cities did not realign themselves with him, we are 
not aware of it. 
 We know that Hannibal’s intelligence remained reliable because he 
continued to surprise the Romans even while he was pinned down in 
southern Italy and when Roman communications, by runners or other 
means, should have provided adequate forewarning. When Hannibal tried 
to draw the Romans away from their siege of Capua, by an attack on Rome 
itself, he managed to startle and panic the city in spite of the fact that a 
messenger from Fregellae had alerted the Romans in advance of his 
arrival.38 Hannibal himself stealthily reconnoitered the city with a bodyguard 
of three men and observed the scarcity of Roman forces and the confusion. 
By suddenly materializing at the city walls of Rome, Hannibal maintained a 
psychological edge and damaged Roman morale, though scoring no 
victories on the battlefield. Hannibal’s indirect tactics also included frequent 
harassment of Roman personnel; Numidian scouts more often than not 
were successful in capturing Romans who wandered too far from camp, and 
in assailing targets of opportunity. The consul Marcellus was killed in just 
such an ambush.39 
 A good spy chief needs counterintelligence to be sure the enemy 
does not discover his plans. Hannibal took pains to avert security leaks in 
his own army. The ability to carry out clandestine operations was of the 
utmost importance when taking walled cities without siege equipment. 
Polybius’ account of how Hannibal conferred with his sympathizers in 
Tarentum in 212 BC, when it was occupied by the Romans, again illustrates 
how he could communicate with his confederates and take cities without 
striking a blow. He positioned himself within striking distance of the city, 
but employed a screening force of Numidians to prevent any news of his 
approach from escaping. The conspirators inside the city set a day for its 
betrayal. At midnight on the appointed date, fire signals were exchanged 
between the conspirators and Hannibal, who was standing by at the tomb 
of Apollo Hyacinthus three-quarters of a mile away. After a well-ordered 
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series of signals, the gates were opened and the Roman garrison was lured 
into the streets. By morning the city was in Carthaginian hands. The success 
of this venture encouraged Metapontum to throw off its allegiance to Rome 
and join Hannibal.40  
 A spy chief can also use a bit of luck. Captured documents revealing 
actions or intentions that require a strategic response do not occur 
frequently in the sources, but Livy relates at least one incident in which the 
Romans seem almost to stumble across vital information. The ambassadors 
of Philip V of Macedon, on their way to Hannibal’s camp carrying a 
proposal of alliance, were intercepted by a Roman patrol near Capua and 
brought before the Roman praetor Valerius Laevinus. They were able to 
convince him their intention was to make an alliance not with Carthage, but 
with Rome. Laevinus was fooled by the story and provided them with not 
only food, but also the exact location of Hannibal’s camp. The ambassadors 
went directly to Hannibal with Philip’s offer of alliance.41 The envoys had 
no such luck on their return trip: the presence of Carthaginian ambassadors 
aboard their ship did little to impress a Roman naval boarding party that 
these Macedonians were allies of Rome. When the ship was searched, the 
agreement and a letter from Hannibal to Philip were confiscated by the 
Romans; the ambassadors were taken prisoner and transported to the 
Roman Senate.42 
 Among his many tradecraft skills, Hannibal had an expertise in 
forging documents. He used these skills to forge a letter to Fabius, and 
made it look as if it had come from the leading citizens of Metapontum. It 
assured Fabius that they would surrender the city to him personally, and 
were only awaiting his arrival there. Had it not been for unfavorable 
auspices that induced the Romans to postpone their march, they would 
have walked straight into Hannibal’s ambush outside the city walls. Plutarch 
is clear: the Romans were saved by the gods, not by their good 
intelligence.43 
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 Perhaps the greatest compliment a spy chief can get is when the 
enemy begins to copy him, and eventually, the Romans began to copy 
Hannibal’s tactics. The first indication we have of a Roman signaling system 
is from the battle of Arpi in Apulia in 213 BC where they operated their 
own network of relays to transmit military information.44 Other incidents 
also suggest that they were learning how to counter some of Hannibal’s 
ploys. When Hannibal defeated and killed the consul Marcellus, he 
immediately took the consul’s ring. The Romans, remembering Hannibal’s 
skill at forging correspondence, acted swiftly and broadcast to neighboring 
city-states that Marcellus had died, that his ring was in enemy hands, and 
that henceforth no letters ostensibly written by him should be trusted. Just 
such a letter reached the city of Salapia, carried by a Roman deserter 
pretending to be the late consul’s messenger. The dispatch, sealed with the 
consul’s ring, asked the Salapians to be ready for Marcellus’ arrival. When a 
phony ‘advance guard’ turned up, in reality a unit of Roman deserters, it was 
welcomed into the city; the Salapians then closed the gates, set upon the 
deserters and killed them. Salapia was thus spared, thanks to prompt 
dissemination of the warning about Marcellus’ captured seal.45  
 
 
The rise of Scipio 
 
It seems obvious that the Romans direly needed a competent leader who 
could be left in command for the duration of the war and could act as a 
central coordinator and chief of intelligence; someone who would not be 
too squeamish about adopting the very methods that had afforded Hannibal 
such success. They found their man in P. Cornelius Scipio the Younger, a 
formidable commander who would soon launch an aggressive campaign 
against the Carthaginians, one who was willing to imitate Hannibal’s modus 
operandi and turn it to Rome’s benefit. Conservatism and constitutional 
niceties had to be laid aside; the Romans were desperate.46 For the first time 
they now had a military strategist who was a match for the enemy. Blending 
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the efficient use of advanced intelligence with vigorous offensive operations 
produced quick results. Scipio deserves credit for one of the most daring 
exploits in the Hannibalic war, a dash and surprise attack on the 
Carthaginian base at New Carthage.47 The city had an excellent harbor, and 
served as a logistic center where the Carthaginians kept the bulk of their 
money and war materiel for the Spanish theater, as well as hostages taken in 
Spain. Scipio’s reconnaissance was meticulous. He studied the plan of the 
city, and also observed that the level of water in the lagoon fell each evening. 
He took advantage of this natural phenomenon in timing his action: 500 
men with ladders scaled the walls in a frontal assault at a moment when they 
were least expected, and the city was taken. The following year, 208 BC, his 
prowess showed again at the battle of Baecula, where he defeated 
Hannibal’s brother Hasdrubal and destroyed most of his cavalry. The battle 
marked the ‘coming of age of Roman military tactics’.48 After Hasdrubal’s 
flight from Baecula, Scipio continued the Roman offensive in Spain, routing 
two Carthaginian armies at Ilipa in 206 BC. Even Polybius admits that 
Scipio was emulating Hannibal’s tactics in holding the enemy forces while 
his cavalry wings outflanked them.49  
 Meanwhile Hasdrubal had broken out of Spain and made his way to 
Italy in an endeavor to bolster Hannibal’s war effort there. 
Counterintelligence would provide the key to a Roman victory. Hannibal, 
trapped in southern Italy, sent messengers north to look for his brother and 
urge Hasdrubal to bring him reinforcements. His brother wrote back 
describing his route along the Adriatic. They agreed to meet in Umbria near 
the sea, and together march on Rome. The bearers of this letter, four Gallic 
horsemen and two Numidians, crossed the entire peninsula without being 
detected. When they lost their way in southern Italy, however, they were 
captured by a Roman detachment near Tarentum and tortured. 50 
Intercepting the message enabled the Romans to locate Hasdrubal at the 
Metaurus River. Hannibal learned of his brother’s defeat and capture when 
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C. Claudius Nero, the Roman victor, threw Hasdrubal’s severed head into 
Hannibal’s camp. Without doubt, Hannibal now realized his last hope of 
reinforcement had perished.51  
 Scipio moved to Africa and after several successful operations there, 
Hannibal was recalled from Italy to respond to the invasion. He set up his 
winter camp, reorganized his troops, and recruited additional soldiers and 
horsemen. By spring of 202 BC, the antagonists were ready to face each 
other in their ultimate showdown. Hannibal brought his force to 
Hadrumentum and lost no time in deploying his spies to collect the 
intelligence he needed. Reports confirmed that all the territory surrounding 
Carthage was occupied by the Romans. Hannibal had to ascertain the size 
and location of the Roman forces, especially the strength of Scipio’s cavalry, 
since his own was still very weak. Spies sent to reconnoiter the Roman 
camp were caught, and, according to Polybius, were shown around the site, 
entertained, and then released and sent back to Hannibal.52 The story has 
often been doubted because similar incidents elsewhere are recounted by 
Herodotus and Dionysius of Halicarnassus and historians suspect a 
borrowing of the tactic for effect.53 But it is not at all improbable that the 
ruse may have been used more than once when one considers the 
psychological effect this ploy would have had on the Carthaginians. Scipio 
wanted his enemy to know he was supremely confident, and that Massinissa 
had not yet arrived with his 6,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. The decisive 
encounter at Zama was the first time Hannibal was ever out-generalled in a 
pitched battle. Copying Hannibal’s tactics at Cannae, Scipio performed the 
double-envelopment maneuver and routed the Carthaginian army in this 
final engagement of the sixteen-year war.54 
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Winning the battles but losing the war 
 
Hannibal’s talent as a general is self-evident and this was due, in no small 
part, to his effective utilization of all the intelligence resources at his 
disposal. He raised tactical maneuver on the battlefield to new heights, while 
also adding the element of surprise. No other army commander in antiquity 
combined these two factors as cleverly as Hannibal, and yet he lost the 
war. 55  This unique blend is regarded as his trademark and the most 
distinctive feature of his generalship.56 Without sound intelligence, none of 
it would have been possible. Granted, intelligence collection was a 
rudimentary affair in the third century BC, but what Hannibal lacked in 
technology he made up for in originality and guile. His victories, which 
brought Rome to the brink of physical, economic, political and moral 
collapse, were products of timely information gathered on his enemy’s 
location, intentions, and capabilities. With no Punic documents surviving, 
we are unable to tell exactly how his intelligence network was organized, but 
Roman records show that it served him well on several levels. His signaling 
and relay systems provided contact between his field headquarters and the 
capital. Secret signs and signals were skillfully used for clandestine 
communication, and he frequently misled the enemy with forged seals and 
documents. Hannibal’s counterintelligence was also superb. He kept the 
Romans in the dark about his own movements, and could trick them into 
believing he was somewhere he was not. He continually practiced 
psychological warfare, and his stratagems left the enemy baffled. 
 Commanders depend on intelligence, first and foremost, to minimize 
the risk of being surprised while maximizing the impact of surprise upon 
the enemy. The other major role of intelligence is to provide for the 
optimum employment of one’s forces by evaluating the enemy’s strengths, 
weaknesses, and objectives. Hannibal’s successes testify to his subtle 
understanding of these concepts. His intelligence information enabled him 
to determine when and where he could most profitably pursue his campaign 
against a numerically superior opponent, inside the opponent’s own 
territory. In all his Italian battles Hannibal was outnumbered, sometimes by 
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ten to one. He relied on cavalry scouts to identify new sources of manpower 
for his mercenary army, as well as to seek battlegrounds that would afford 
him topographic advantage. Hannibal makes the planning of the ambush 
like that at Lake Trasimene look so simple, we tend to forget how unique an 
ambush on such a scale is in warfare. Even Cannae, which was executed in 
full view of the enemy, was little more than a large trap.57 Hannibal relied on 
speed, maintained the initiative, and mobilized a variety of intelligence 
expedients in support of limited goals. The Romans, on the other hand, had 
to cope with the military paradox of being strategically on the defensive, 
while tactically on a perpetual search for Hannibal’s elusive army. Even if 
their intelligence capabilities had been been comparable, Hannibal would 
still have had an operative advantage reminiscent of that held by guerrilla 
groups over regular armed forces, ancient and modern. However, guerrillas 
do not ordinarily win wars unless the regular army they are fighting against 
makes egregious mistakes, or loses its political base. 
 Hannibal’s positive attitude toward intelligence was as much a 
function of his own genius as it was a reflection of a Carthaginian system. 
His personality traits, more than anything else, gave the Second Punic War 
its epic quality. ‘The adequacy of the intelligence that a commander has 
available is in direct proportion to his interest in intelligence and his use of 
it’.58 He had an extraordinary capacity for leadership while commanding a 
mercenary army amid danger and defeat. It is not surprising that he 
complemented his mercenary army with an outstanding intelligence 
apparatus. It took another individualist like Scipio to take heed of 
Hannibal’s example and put it into practice for the Romans. What the 
Romans learned from Hannibal was that an experienced and responsible 
general simply does not move into a region about which he knows next to 
nothing without having first obtained thoroughly detailed geographical, 
political and military intelligence.59 Hannibal never allowed the enemy to pin 
him down for long, never squandered his men in useless engagements, 
never tried crudely to batter his way through a check or a difficulty, but 
always kept his options open. 
 If Hannibal was such a good intelligence chief, why then did he lose 
the war? He failed because the political and strategic advantages were 
intrinsically in Rome’s favor. Hannibal lost and lost badly on the strategic 
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level. Skills such as tactical brilliance, competent leadership, and effective 
intelligence gathering were not enough to beat the Romans. What Hannibal 
did not have was better strategic intelligence or control of the war. 
Hannibal’s idea of invading Italy directly was a valid plan of action, but it 
could not neutralize the Roman superiority at sea and in manpower, the 
loyalty of Rome’s allies, their ability to bar reinforcements from reaching 
Hannibal, and finally, Scipio’s counteroffensive. Few of these developments 
could have been predicted in advance, even with the best of intelligence. 
When the wider objectives of Hannibal’s original invasion plan were 
obviously not being accomplished, and the subsequent attempts at opening 
new fronts to encircle Rome had failed, he was stalled. Hannibal lost the 
strategic advantage when the scene of action moved to Spain and Sicily.60 
Carthage, as a whole, lacked any clearly thought-out political aim in the war 
except recovering the status quo ante bellum. Hannibal was fighting not to 
occupy Italy but to win a peace that would restore Sicily, Spain, Sardinia, 
and Corsica to Carthaginian control. A vital ingredient of Hannibal’s 
strategy was to drive a wedge between Rome and her allies, but he offered 
nothing to the allies in Rome’s place, beside ‘liberation’.61 
 Hannibal’s death would also cheat Rome of satisfaction. In 183 BC, 
nineteen years after Zama, the Roman Senate decreed that Hannibal should 
no longer remain at large. Roman agents tracked him down in Bithynia and 
surrounded his villa. Their intention was either to kill him or transport him 
alive to Rome where he would be a central figure in a triumph procession. 
That the Romans would take the trouble to hunt down a 64-year-old man, 
at an obscure town by the Sea of Marmara, indicates that he still was a 
valuable symbol if not indeed an actual threat. They would never rest as 
long as Hannibal was alive. His last words reportedly were: ‘Let us release 
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the Romans from their long anxiety since they think it too long to wait for 
the death of an old man’.62 When the Romans soldiers entered the villa they 
found him dead, a suicide; once again, and for the last time, he was one step 
ahead of his enemies. 
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